We write separately today to reiterate a point that several Commissioners made recently:[1] the time has likely come for the Commission to reconsider how it approaches hypothetical capital structure incentives. While modifications to the Commission’s approach are not ripe for today’s order, we remain committed to reexamining this policy.
As has been said before, it is increasingly obvious that a key barrier to energy infrastructure buildout in this country is fostering public trust that particular projects are needed. Transparency as to how the Commission will consider requests for incentive rate treatments is essential to increasing certainty that needed infrastructure is constructed. This especially applies to the hypothetical capital structure requests, like the one at issue in today’s order, and—in our view—it is time to develop an approach that more thoughtfully and deliberately balances affordability concerns, the need for transparency, and the imperative that we provide as much certainty as necessary to build energy infrastructure. We believe that project sponsors can and should do more to explain how their projects, and their requests for a hypothetical capital structure, will provide reliable power and save consumers money.
We look forward to working with our colleagues to sharpen our evaluation of hypothetical capital structure requests.
For these reasons, we respectfully concur.
[1] MGS Wisconsin, 195 FERC ¶ 61,251 at P 1 (Swett, Chairman, and Rosner, Comm’r, concurring).