Docket No. EL23-96-000
I concur in today’s order because it is consistent with the Commission’s existing policies regarding the Abandoned Plant Incentive, as articulated in Order No. 679.[1] Moreover, and importantly, any costs that result from granting NYPA this incentive will not be paid by consumers in any state outside of New York.
I have made my views on this subject known in other proceedings, but it bears restatement here: The costs related to a public policy project – which the Propel NY Energy Alternate Solution 5 Project is[2] – should be borne by the sponsoring state and not shifted to consumers in other states without the consent of responsible officials in those states, who can then be held accountable by the voters of that state for their decisions (as can officials in the sponsoring state). That is how democracy is supposed to work. As I noted in my concurrence to a 2022 NYISO-related order:
Here the record shows – and this is critically important to my analysis – that no one has suggested that this single-state ISO’s proposal to accommodate the resource decisions made by the New York legislature will harm consumers in other states. Thus, there being no evidence in this record that citizens of other states will be made to pay for New York’s policy decisions through the potential impacts of NYISO’s proposed tariff revisions, I conclude that any costs will be confined to New York. Based on the particular set of facts in this record, I do not find that the NYISO proposal “as-applied” results in rates that are “unjust, unreasonable and unduly discriminatory or preferential” under the FPA. If the people and businesses of New York do not like the impacts of their new state laws, their recourse is to the ballot box.[3]
Here, there is no evidence in the record, nor is there any protest or comment to suggest, that consumers other than those in the state of New York would pay the costs associated with the Abandoned Plant Incentive at issue in today’s order in the event of abandonment.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
[1] Promoting Transmission Inv. through Pricing Reform, Order No. 679, 116 FERC ¶ 61,057, order on reh’g, Order No. 679-A, 117 FERC ¶ 61,345 (2006), order on reh’g, 119 FERC ¶ 61,062 (2007). However, as I have expressed in prior statements, I am concerned that the Commission’s awarding of the Abandoned Plant Incentive and other incentives has become nothing more than a check-the-box exercise at the expense of consumers. See, e.g., The Potomac Edison Co., 185 FERC ¶ 61,083 (2023) (Christie, Comm’r, concurring at P 2) (available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-christies-concurrence-concerning-potomac-edisons-abandoned-plant); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 182 FERC ¶ 61,039 (2023) (Christie, Comm’r, concurring at P 2) (available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-christies-concurrence-midcontinent-independent-system-operator-inc); NextEra Energy Transmission Sw., LLC, 180 FERC ¶ 61,032 (2022) (Christie, Comm’r, concurring at P 2) (available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-christies-concurrence-nextera-energy-transmission-southwest-llc); NextEra Energy Transmission Sw., LLC, 178 FERC ¶ 61,082 (2022) (Christie, Comm’r, concurring at P 2) (available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-mark-c-christie-concurrence-nextera-energy-transmission-southwest-llc).
[2] See, e.g., Petition at 14-15 (“NYISO found that the Project is a complete, viable, and sufficient solution to satisfy the State’s Public Policy Transmission Need that was identified by the [New York State Public Service Commission], as it would unbottle a significant amount of [offshore wind] generation to southeast New York and advance the development of planned renewable generation in the Long Island area.”).
[3] N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 179 FERC ¶ 61,102 (2022) (Christie, Comm’r, concurring at P 3 (emphasis in original) (available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-christies-concurrence-nyiso-tariff-revisions-re-marginal-capacity) (quoting N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 178 FERC ¶ 61,101 (2022) (Christie, Comm’r, concurring at PP 4-6) (available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/item-e-2-commissioner-mark-c-christie-concurrence-regarding-new-york-independent)); see also NSTAR Elec Co., 179 FERC ¶ 61,200 (2022) (Christie, Comm’r, concurring at P 10) (“To reiterate, imposing the costs of a project driven by one state’s public policies onto another state that has not consented to such cost allocation would, in my view, presumably result in unjust and unreasonable rates.”) (available at https://www.ferc.gov/media/e-13-er22-1247-000); N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 174 FERC ¶ 61,110 (2021) (Christie, Comm’r, concurring at P 3) (“I also note that the NYISO is a single-state ISO and I have been able to locate no evidence in the record that the New York policies at issue in today’s order are causing cost-shifting onto consumers in other states. If consumers in other states were disadvantaged, I may well view this matter differently.”) (emphasis added) (available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/item-e-2-commissioner-mark-c-christie-concurrence-regarding-new-york-state-public); cf. Commissioner Mark C. Christie, Fair RATES Act Statement on PJM Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) Revisions, Docket No. ER21-2582-000 at P 6 (Oct. 19, 2021) (“. . . I would have proposed that PJM formulate a replacement for the current MOPR based on three broad principles: (1) a state may designate specific or categorical resources as ‘public policy resources’ and such designated resources will be funded through a mechanism chosen by the state outside of the capacity market . . . and (3) non-sponsoring state consumers would not be forced to pay for another state’s designated public-policy resources.”) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in the original and added) (available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-christies-fair-rates-act-statement-pjm-mopr).