Commissioner Richard Glick Statement
January 9, 2020
Docket No. ER19-1164-000
Concurrence in Part, Dissent in Part Regarding Constellation Mystic Power, LLC
I agree that Constellation Mystic Power, LLC (Mystic) has not shown that its proposal to add a unilateral termination provision to its cost-of-service agreement is just and reasonable, although I disagree with the Commission’s rationale for reaching that conclusion. By this point, the facts of the Mystic saga are well-established.1
Suffice it to say that Exelon realized that the Mystic facility played a potentially important role in ensuring reliability in New England and sought to take advantage of that position in what our former colleague Commissioner Powelson aptly described as “an unprecedented exercise of market power.”2
In a series of orders, the Commission assented and ultimately accepted much—although, to its credit, not all—of Mystic’s proposed two-year cost-of-service agreement.3
I dissented from those orders because the Commission committed a serious error in prematurely seizing control of the fuel security debate within New England.4
Rather than ensuring reliability, the Commission gave Mystic license to hold the region over a barrel and force customers to fork over hundreds of millions of dollars based on a highly contested study.5
That was not—and is not—a responsible way to manage the region’s long-term fuel security.
Accepting Mystic’s proposed amendment in this proceeding would be more of the same. As protesters explained, granting Mystic’s request to add a unilateral termination provision to its cost-of-service agreement would give Mystic another opportunity to extract every last penny from the region’s customers without any countervailing benefit.6
Specifically, it would allow Mystic to back out of its cost-of-service agreement—or threaten to do so—in order to secure additional concessions from ISO New England or otherwise earn an even greater return through the market. Given that customers are already on the hook for Mystic’s full cost-of-service, I do not see how adding a “heads I win, tails you lose” provision to the agreement would be a just and reasonable result.
The Commission reaches the same conclusion, but for an entirely different reason. It repeats its belief that Mystic is needed for fuel security and, therefore, cannot be permitted to back out of its cost-of-service agreement.7
Because I do not share that belief,8
I dissent from the portions of today’s order that rely on that rationale to support the outcome. Instead, I would reject Mystic’s proposed amendment on the basis of its potential to further harm the region’s customers.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
- 12 Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,022 (2018) (Powelson, Comm’r, dissenting at 5).
- 21 See Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 170 FERC ¶ 61,006, at PP 2-3 (2020) (Order).
- 33 See, e.g., Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 165 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2018).
- 44 E.g., id. (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting at 1); ISO New England Inc., 164 FERC ¶ 61,003 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part at 3); accord ISO New England Inc., 164 FERC ¶ 61,003 (Powelson, Comm’r, dissenting in part at 1) (“I cannot, however, support prematurely clearing a path towards out-of-market, cost-of-service payments to generators without having fully exhausting all other alternatives.”).
- 55 ISO New England Inc., 164 FERC ¶ 61,003 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part at 2).
- 66 Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel, and Connecticut Attorney General Protest at 5-7; Eastern New England Consumer-Owned Systems Protest at 5-8; Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company and New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc. Protest at 5, 7-9.
- 77 Order, 170 FERC ¶ 61,006 at P 14.
- 88 See Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 165 FERC ¶ 61,267 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting at 5-6 & n.23).