Docket No. ER21-2460-002
While I concur in the approval of the order, I note that the order and the record in this matter are exceedingly complex, sometimes indecipherable and possibly unworkable, thus illustrating the inherent flaws in Order No. 2222 and its progeny, described in my dissent to Order No. 2222-A[1] and my concurrences to extensions of the deadline to submit filings to comply with the requirements of Order No. 2222 for MISO, SPP and PJM[2] and for ISO-NE.[3]
Specifically, in my Concurrence to the Extension Order, I stated:
The motions filed by each of MISO, SPP and PJM illustrate the daunting complexities, potential negative impacts on reliability, and certain increased costs to consumers, all of which I referenced in my dissent to Order No. 2222-A and which apply equally to its forebear, Order No. 2222. The problems and complexities of compliance described in these motions is further evidence that implementing Order Nos. 2222 and 2222-A will be far more complicated, far more costly to consumers and far more burdensome to states, public and municipal power authorities, and electric co-operatives, than these orders and many of their supporters acknowledge. . . .
As I said in my remarks at the March 18, 2021 Commission Open Meeting at which Order No. 2222-A was approved and in my written dissent to that order, the costs of compliance with both Order Nos. 2222 and 2222-A will be far more substantial than have been recognized and, ultimately, consumers will pay them.[4]
This order graphically illustrates my earlier warning:
These motions offer a preview of what’s coming in terms of the complications and impacts on reliability caused by these orders and the substantial costs that will have to be expended not only to address those threats but to address the complexity of the requirements these orders impose, costs that will be piled on consumers.[5]
NYISO was quite clear that the Commission’s statements in its June 2022 Order[6] (i) raised significant reliability concerns,[7] (ii) are impracticable, overly prescriptive, fundamentally inconsistent with NYISO’s market design, and practically impossible to implement in the near future,[8] and (iii) reflected that the Commission had likely not considered the cost-benefit of the ramifications of that language on NYISO, Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and Aggregators.[9] Such costs would, as I have before noted, certainly be passed on to consumers. So, while I agree that NYISO should not be required to allow a heterogeneous Aggregation to simultaneously make available multiple operating reserve products, given the overwhelming complexities of these issues and how they relate to costly software solutions and other market workings, the order may not adequately address other concerns NYISO expressed but which were masked by these complexities.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
[1] Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, Order No. 2222-A, 174 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2021) (Christie, Comm’r, dissenting, available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/item-e-1-commissioner-mark-c-christie-dissent-regarding-participation-distributed).
[2] Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 175 FERC ¶ 61,013 (2021) (Christie, Comm’r, concurring, available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-mark-c-christie-concurrence-regarding-order-granting-compliance ) (Concurrence to the Extension Order).
[3] Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 175 FERC ¶ 61,156 (2021) (Christie, Comm’r, concurring, available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-mark-c-christie-concurrence-regarding-order-granting-compliance-0).
[4] Concurrence to the Extension Order at PP 3, 7 (emphasis in original and added) (footnotes omitted).
[5] Id. P 7.
[6] N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 179 FERC ¶ 61,198 (2022).
[7] See, e.g., NYISO July 18, 2022 Request for Clarification or, in the Alternative, Rehearing at 15 (“The Commission’s directive presents a reliability concern.”) (emphasis added); id. at 16 (“It is arbitrary and capricious for the Commission to insist that [] the NYISO implement rules that are technically impracticable, particularly when attempting to implement the requirements that the Commission has instructed could threaten reliability.) (emphasis added).
[8] See, e.g., id. at 12 (“If Paragraph 93 is not clarified as requested above then its directive is overly prescriptive, fundamentally inconsistent with the NYISO’s market design, practically impossible to implement in the near future, and could threaten reliability. It does not reflect reasoned decision-making and is not based on substantial evidence. Paragraph 93 failed to offer a reasoned explanation for disregarding record evidence demonstrating the impracticability of requiring the NYISO to permit DER Aggregations to simultaneously make available multiple Operating Reserve products, each with distinct quantity limits, even though evidence of other practical limitations that constrained the NYISO’s implementation of DER was accepted elsewhere in the June 17 Order. In addition, P[aragraph] 93’s requirement that the NYISO obtain operating and performance information about individual DER and use that information to manage their market participation contradicts Order No. 2222. In short, if Paragraph 93 is not clarified, its directive is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act [] and must be modified on rehearing.”) (emphasis added).
[9] See, e.g., id. at 22 (“The NYISO is concerned that the Commission has failed to adequately consider the costs the NYISO, DER and Aggregators will incur to permit NYISO to more closely manage the participation of individual DER in heterogeneous DER Aggregations. The Commission has not weigh[]ed expected implementation costs against the additional Operating Reserves the New York Control Area will gain, or the additional revenues that DER will receive”); id. at 2 (“While it is clear that the added complexity, resources and time necessary to develop and implement such additional functionality would be significant, it is not clear if the investment in this added functionality would provide equivalent benefits to reliability or market efficiency.”).