I partially dissent from the Order for two reasons. First, I dissent from the discussion in paragraphs 62 and 63 contending the Commission has no means for assessing the significance of the impacts of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.[1] As I have repeatedly explained, this language is objectionable because it (1) reflects a final Commission decision that it cannot determine the significance of GHG emissions, despite the fact the Commission has never responded to comments in the GHG Policy Statement docket[2] addressing methods for doing so; and (2) departs from previous Commission precedent without reasoned explanation, thereby violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).[3]
Second, I dissent from the Order’s discussion in paragraphs 62 and 63 because there is a tool the Commission can use to assess the significance of GHG emissions: the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gas Protocol (SC-GHG Protocol). The Natural Gas Act (NGA),[4] the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),[5] and the APA[6] require the Commission to assess and fully consider the environmental impacts of the 2024 Expansion Project’s GHG emissions, which it failed to do because of its misguided rejection of the SC-GHG Protocol. For the same reasons I explained in Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co.,[7] the Commission should have (a) used the SC-GHG Protocol to assess the significance of the project’s GHG emissions in its NEPA analysis, (b) factored the SC-GHG Protocol’s monetized values into its NGA section 7 public interest determination, and (c) fully explained in the Order how it factored the project’s GHG emissions into its decision to issue a certificate for the project.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part.
[1] Great Basin Gas Transmission Co., 187 FERC ¶ 61,043, at PP 62-63 (2024) (Order).
[2] Docket No. PL21-3.
[3] In my concurrence in Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 184 FERC ¶ 61,066 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, concurring, at PP 2-3), I explained the history of the language, which the majority suddenly adopted in Driftwood Pipeline LLC, 183 FERC ¶ 61,049, at PP 61, 63 (2023) (Driftwood). I dissented from this language in Driftwood and every subsequent order in which it has appeared. See Driftwood, 183 FERC ¶ 61,049 (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3 & n.5); see also Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 187 FERC ¶ 61,024 (2024) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting at P 1); Gas Transmission Nw., LLC, 187 FERC ¶ 61,023 (2024) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting at P 28); E. Tenn. Nat. Gas, LLC, 186 FERC ¶ 61,210 (2024) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 186 FERC ¶ 61,209 (2024) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); N. Nat. Gas Co., 186 FERC ¶ 61,064 (2024) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); Saguaro Connector Pipeline, LLC, 186 FERC ¶ 61,114 (2024) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-4); Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 186 FERC ¶ 61,113 (2024) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 186 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2024) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 186 FERC ¶ 61,048 (2024) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-4); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 186 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2024) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 8-9); Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 186 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2024) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 1-2); ANR Pipeline Co., 185 FERC ¶ 61,191 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 185 FERC ¶ 61,133 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-4); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 185 FERC ¶ 61,130 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); Tex. LNG Brownsville LLC, 185 FERC ¶ 61,079 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 9-10); Rio Grande LNG, LLC, 185 FERC ¶ 61,080 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 9-10); Gas Transmission Nw., LLC, 185 FERC ¶ 61,035 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, concurring in part and dissenting in part at PP 7-8); WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., 185 FERC ¶ 61,036 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); Venture Glob. Plaquemines LNG, LLC, 185 FERC ¶ 61,037 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); Tex. E. Transmission, LP, 185 FERC ¶ 61,038 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); Trailblazer Pipeline Co., 185 FERC ¶ 61,039 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-4); Equitrans, L.P., 185 FERC ¶ 61,040 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-4); Port Arthur LNG Phase II, LLC, 184 FERC ¶ 61,184 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); Venture Glob. Calcasieu Pass, LLC, 184 FERC ¶ 61,185 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-4); N. Nat. Gas Co., 184 FERC ¶ 61,186 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-3); Tex. E. Transmission, LP, 184 FERC ¶ 61,187 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting in part at PP 2-4); Equitrans, LP, 183 FERC ¶ 61,200 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r dissenting at PP 2-3); Commonwealth LNG, LLC, 183 FERC ¶ 61,173 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 5-8); Rio Grande LNG, LLC, 183 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 14-15); Tex. LNG Brownsville LLC, 183 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2023) (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 14-15).
[4] NGA § 7(e), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e). Courts have recognized that the Commission must consider the impacts of a proposed project’s GHG emissions in determining the “public convenience and necessity” under the NGA. See Vecinos Para el Bienstar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th 1321, 1329, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Vecinos) (finding the Commission’s analysis of climate change impacts deficient and directing the Commission to revisit its NEPA analysis and NGA public interest determination after correcting deficiencies); see also Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 45 F.4th 104, 109, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (finding the Commission’s NGA section 7 balancing of public benefits and adverse consequences reasonably accounted for potential environmental impacts” and noting that in some circumstances GHG emissions are a reasonably foreseeable effect of a pipeline project that must be studied under NEPA); Food & Water Watch v. FERC, 28 F.4th 277, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (recognizing the NGA section 7 certificate process incorporates environmental review under NEPA, which includes analysis of downstream GHG emissions.); Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 518-519 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (affirming previous holdings that the Commission is the “legally relevant cause of the direct and indirect environmental effects of pipelines it approves,” including reasonably foreseeable GHG emissions (cleaned up)); Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (addressing Commission’s treatment of GHG emissions and explaining that the Commission’s public convenience and necessity determination must weigh a project’s environmental effects).
[5] See, e.g., Council on Environmental Quality, National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change, 88 Fed. Reg. 1196, 1202 (Jan. 9, 2023) (“In most instances . . . [agencies] should apply the best available estimates of the SC-GHG to the incremental metric tons of each individual type of GHG emissions [in their NEPA analyses]. . .”); Mont. Env't Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1099 (D. Mont. 2017) (finding the Office of Surface Mining needed to consider the SC-GHG Protocol in a NEPA analysis); High Country Conservation Advocs. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1193 (D. Colo. 2014) (rejecting an EIS as deficient for not using the SC-GHG Protocol to assess climate impacts).
[6] The APA requires the Commission to provide a reasoned explanation of its decisions, including how it factors GHG emissions into its public interest determinations under the NGA. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (“[T]he orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.”); Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 753 F.3d 1304, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[A]n agency action will be set aside as arbitrary and capricious if it is not the product of ‘reasoned decisionmaking.’” (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983))).
[7] 187 FERC ¶ 61,024 (Clements, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 2-18).