Public Service Company of Colorado
Docket No. ER23-629-001
I concur with the Commission’s decision to accept PSCo’s alternative proposal to require interconnection customers to post $7.5 million in security, and with the Commission’s acceptance of PSCo’s proposal to require $5 million after receipt of an LGIA and impose a $5 million penalty for withdrawals after executing an LGIA. I write separately, however, to highlight further changes to PSCo’s LGIP that may be necessary in light of these revisions.
PSCo does not propose to modify its existing LGIP language addressing distribution of the withdrawal penalty, nor is there any discussion in the record of the potential implications of PSCo’s proposal with regard to how such distribution should occur. But further changes to those provisions may be appropriate in light of the Commission’s acceptance of PSCo’s increase of the relevant deposit amounts.
PSCo’s LGIP provides that “[a]ny Withdrawal Penalty revenues shall be used to fund generation interconnection studies,” and sets forth a process to determine which studies, and customers, the amount shall be credited to.[1] But this language does not appear to address how such funds should be distributed in the event that they exceed relevant study costs. PSCo’s proposed increase of the relevant penalties raises the possibility that such penalties will exceed the relevant study costs, and as such, clarification to the LGIP to address such a circumstance may be appropriate.
Further, PSCo’s response to the Commission’s deficiency letter indicates that PSCo’s process may not provide for swift resolution of the question of how funds should be distributed. PSCo notes that it “has had 11 projects withdraw from the queue, which collectively had provided $11.7 million dollars of at-risk financial security,” but explains that it must complete cascading restudies of interconnection request clusters as a necessary step before determining how to distribute such funds.[2] Given PSCo’s proposed increase in withdrawal penalties, the importance of distributing the funds in a prompt and fair manner is heightened.
While the Commission may approve PSCo’s proposal without simultaneously addressing implications for the distribution of withdrawal penalties that are not before us,[3] I encourage PSCo to assess whether further changes to its LGIP may be necessary in light of the Commission’s approval of increased withdrawal penalties. If PSCo’s proposal renders its existing mechanism for distribution of withdrawal penalties unjust and unreasonable and further changes are not forthcoming, then action pursuant to section 206 of the Federal Power Act may be appropriate.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
[1] See PSCo Current LGIP, § 3.7.1.2
[2] Deficiency Response at 14.
[3] See Advanced Energy Management Alliance v. FERC, 860 F.3d 656 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“The Commission could find that PJM’s proposed capacity market rules were just and reasonable under section 205 even though they rendered some rules in PJM’s energy market unjust and unreasonable.”).