Commissioner James Danly Statement
December 30, 2021
Docket No. ER22-565-000
Today, the Commission grants yet another plainly unlawful retroactive waiver, this time to permit PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) to ignore the fact that Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Allegheny) missed a deadline, thereby awarding Allegheny rollover rights to continue receiving transmission service on the terms it currently enjoys.[1] The problem is that the missed deadline is part of PJM’s filed tariff. The Commission waives the deadline, saves the day, and avoids the irritating complications of the filed rate doctrine. We have seen this drama many times before and it is always disappointing.[2]
Unambiguous, uninterrupted and controlling judicial precedent holds that a utility can only charge the rate on file. This is called the filed rate doctrine.[3] It is a core tenet of utility regulation. The Commission also has no authority to permit utilities to charge rates other than those on file unless there is advance notice that the rate may change or the Commission has approved a tariff allowing the utility to charge different rates prospectively. This is called the rule against retroactive ratemaking.[4] This rule is also a core tenet of utility regulation and is a necessary adjunct to the filed rate doctrine. There would be little point in having rates on file if rate changes can be retroactively imposed. Both the filed rate doctrine and the rule against retroactive ratemaking also apply to non-rate terms and conditions in filed tariffs.[5]
As the D.C. Circuit very recently explained, “[t]he filed rate requirement is stringent and admits of no equitable adjustments by the Commission or this court.”[6] Because this rule is so hard and fast, the Commission cannot retroactively waive the filed rate, even in the most compelling circumstances, including emergencies. The Commission, however, has been in the practice of routinely granting retroactive waivers and it usually does so without even acknowledging that it has engaged in retroactive ratemaking.[7] In many of these cases, no one opposes the waiver and thus no one can appeal the Commission’s order. But the absence of opposition does not make the unlawful lawful.
In this case, Allegheny asserts that its “waiver is not seeking retroactive relief from an expired tariff deadline.”[8] That statement is false. That is exactly what Allegheny seeks as the PJM Tariff required Allegheny to provide notice nearly one year ago. The PJM Tariff provides that “the existing customer [Allegheny] must notify [PJM] no later than one year prior to the end of the term of its firm transmission contract that it is exercising its transmission reservation priority and will take transmission service for an additional term of five years or longer . . . .”[9] Allegheny’s transmission contract expires on January 1, 2022. Therefore, Allegheny was required to notify PJM whether it intended to exercise its transmission reservation priority by January 1, 2021. That date has been known to Allegheny since it signed the contract. That date has “expired” because it is in the past. That is how time works.
In support of its false assertion that the lapsed deadline has not “expired,” Allegheny claims “[r]ather, the request is for waiver of the PJM Tariff provisions that would otherwise obligate Allegheny to provide formal notification to PJM.”[10] Yes, that is exactly right. Allegheny needs that troublesome deadline that is part of the filed rate and that has already passed to be written out of the PJM Tariff. “[O]therwise, [Allegheny] shall forfeit the transmission reservation priority associated with the contract.”[11]
Allegheny argues that the waiver is prospective because the contracts do not expire until January 1, 2022. That is two days from now. Therefore, the waiver of a January 1, 2021 deadline—363 days ago—is prospective. In support, the majority cites two cases where the Commission prospectively waived a 90-day notice requirement for transactions that had not yet closed and asserts that these cases “find[] that a requested waiver of a tariff notice provision within the relevant notice period was prospective.” [12] This is an overly simplistic restatement of their holdings. The tariff provision at issue in those cases required 90 days of notice before a party could close a transaction. The specific date of the notice requirement (90 days in advance of closing) was unknown because closing had not yet occurred. Closing was at some indeterminate point in the future. If the Commission denied the waivers, the parties would simply have to provide 90 days’ notice. If granted, the parties could provide notice shortly before closing, whenever closing may occur. By granting the waiver, the Commission is informing all parties that the Commission will not require 90 days of notice before closing. Instead, they can close at any time.
These cases do not mean, however, that every “requested waiver of a tariff notice provision within the relevant notice period [is] prospective.” In this case, we have a fixed and certain tariff deadline—January 1, 2021. If the Commission does not waive the PJM Tariff deadline, the contract terminates by its own terms on January 1, 2022. By granting the waiver, the Commission is revoking the January 1, 2021 deadline in the PJM Tariff. That is unlawful retroactive ratemaking. The contract is set to expire in two days but will now continue notwithstanding the missed deadline.
One key test whether a waiver is retroactive and therefore unlawful is whether a tariff violation already has occurred that must be “excused” via the waiver. In the 90-day notice cases, the parties seeking to close a transaction have missed no deadlines in seeking waiver of the 90-day notice requirement before closing has occurred. If closing already has occurred when they seek waiver, they are too late. In this case, the January 1, 2021 deadline to exercise rollover rights already has come and gone. Waiver would “excuse” that violation by writing the fixed and lapsed deadline out of the PJM Tariff.
Granting Allegheny’s waiver based on its claim that the deadline waiver is prospective because the contracts have not yet expired would allow the Commission to invalidate every notice deadline in every tariff because “notice” always happens before the act. That is the point of “notice.” But the filed rate doctrine dictates that you can only lawfully waive the notice period before the notice deadline has lapsed.
Denying the waiver does lead to the result that Allegheny’s contract will expire. That is what the contract and the PJM Tariff provide. The PJM Tariff does not have to include a one-year notice requirement to exercise rollover rights, but it does. PJM chose to include the deadline, and it is an approved part of the filed rate. The provision provides no notice that the deadline can be waived or is otherwise optional. Waiving that deadline today thus plainly violates the rule against retroactive ratemaking.
The majority’s holding to grant waiver only serves to further hollow out the filed rate doctrine. If jettisoning a deadline that has already lapsed is not retroactive ratemaking, what is? The Commission could always say it is “prospectively” deciding that the rate on file should not be applied to past events, “starting today.” Eventually, another appellate court will rule that “retroactive” means “retroactive,” plain and simple. Until then, rates on file are only as certain as the next waiver request.
I disagree not only with the outcome in this case but also the process. The standard four criteria that the Commission applies—incoherently, I might add—are of no consequence whatever if the requested waiver is retroactive.[13] Allegheny’s alleged “good faith” is impossible when it seeks an unambiguously unlawful retroactive waiver. The “limited in scope” criterion has turned out to be subjective and meaningless, as all waivers the Commission wants to grant are deemed as such no matter how vast the scope of the waiver.[14] The “concrete problem” criterion is nonsense—the problem in any retroactive waiver proceeding is always that the filed rate requires something the requesting party seeks to overrule. And the no “undesirable consequences” element is absurd on its face as any change to the filed rate necessarily has an effect on every other customer who expected the filed rate to be as filed and approved and now suddenly it becomes something else. What about all of the other parties that also would like to use the transmission service PJM and Allegheny just renewed for themselves?
I will continue to expect every request for waiver of a filed rate to discuss Oklahoma Gas and clearly explain why the request is not retroactive. To do otherwise is to intentionally obscure a fundamental, threshold issue with which we must grapple. I will address this issue in every single case granting an unlawful retroactive waiver, and I will continue to do so until a court of competent jurisdiction eventually reins in the Commission’s abuse of authority.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
________________________
James P. Danly
Commissioner
[1] Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc., 177 FERC ¶ 61,240 (2021) (Allegheny).
[2] See, e.g., Caney River Wind Project, LLC, 176 FERC ¶ 61,097 (2021) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting).
[3] See Waiver of Tariff Requirements, 171 FERC ¶ 61,156, at P 5 & n.13 (2020) (Proposed Policy Statement) (citing Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981) (Arkla); Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1951)).
[4] Id. P 5 & n.14 (citing Arkla, 453 U.S. at 578).
[5] Id. P 6 (citations omitted); Ok. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 11 F.4th 821, 830 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Oklahoma Gas) (citations omitted).
[6] Oklahoma Gas, 11 F.4th at 832.
[7] See, e.g., SunEnergy1, LLC, 176 FERC ¶ 61,004 (2021) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 9-13); Buchanan Cnty. Solar Project, LLC, 175 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2021) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting); Rolling Hills Generating, L.L.C., 175 FERC ¶ 61,108 (2021) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting); Novera Energy, LLC, 175 FERC ¶ 61,107 (2021) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting); TGE Pennsylvania 202, LLC, 175 FERC ¶ 61,080 (2021) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 4-6); Leeward Renewable Energy, LLC, 175 FERC ¶ 61,079 (2021) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 1, 4-6); Grover Hill Wind, LLC, 174 FERC ¶ 61,240 (2021) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting at P 1); RRE Power LLC, 174 FERC ¶ 61,052 (2021) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 1-2); Stoney Creek Solar LLC, 174 FERC ¶ 61,054 (2021) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 1-2); Glidepath Ventures, LLC, 173 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2020) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 1-5); Lightsource Renewable Energy Dev., LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,294 (2020) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 1-4).
[8] Allegheny December 2, 2021 Petition at 2 n.2.
[9] PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Open Access Transmission Tariff (PJM Tariff), § 2.3 Procedures for Exercising Transmission Reservation Priority Rights, at § 2.3(b) (1.0.0.).
[10] Allegheny December 2, 2021 Petition at 2 n.2.
[11] PJM Tariff § 2.3(b).
[12] Allegheny at P 13, citing CPV Fairview, LLC, 174 FERC ¶ 61,029, at P 12 (2021) (“finding that a requested waiver of a tariff notice provision within the relevant notice period was prospective”); UGI Dev. Co., 172 FERC ¶ 61,196, at P 11 (2020) (same).
[13] City of Independence, Missouri, 177 FERC ¶ 61,013 at PP 14-15.
[14] See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 176 FERC ¶ 61,159 (2021) (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting) (seeking to waive interconnection process for certain generators).