Commissioner Richard Glick Statement
December 9, 2020
Docket Nos. ER20-2845-001 et al.
I agree with the Commission’s decision to grant Albemarle Beach Solar, LLC, Mechanicsville Lessee, LLC, and AB Lessee, LLC (Sellers) market-based rate authority. It is Commission policy to “allow[] power sales at market-based rates if the Seller and its affiliates do not have, or have adequately mitigated, horizontal and vertical market power.”[1] Although the PJM Market Monitor raises concerns about the adequacy of market power mitigation in the PJM energy and capacity markets, it has not in this proceeding provided any particularized evidence that these Sellers have the potential to exercise market power in those markets.[2] I therefore agree that the Market Monitor has not shown that market-based rate authority should be denied.[3]
Nevertheless, the concerns raised by the Market Monitor are serious and demand the Commission’s attention. Indeed, the Market Monitor has raised many of the same concerns in a complaint that has been pending before this Commission for nearly two years.[4] That complaint, regarding PJM’s Market Seller Offer Cap, raises serious allegations that go to the core of the Commission’s responsibility to ensure that rates remain just and reasonable and it deserves the Commission’s attention sooner rather than later.[5] Accordingly, while I agree with the determination in today’s order, I believe it is the Commission’s duty to thoroughly evaluate and judge the merits of the claims made by the Market Monitor to ensure the competitiveness of PJM’s markets.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
[1] Refinements to Horizontal Mkt. Power Analysis for Sellers in Certain Reg’l Transmission Orgs. & Indep. Sys. Operator Mkts., Order No. 861, 168 FERC ¶ 61,040, at P 5 (2019) (citing Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Elec. Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Servs. by Pub. Utils., Order No. 697, 119 FERC ¶ 61,295, at PP 62, 399, 408, 440 (2008)).
[2] Market Monitor Protest at 3 (acknowledging that Order No. 861 requires a determination that the Sellers have market power in the relevant market) (citing Order No. 861, 168 FERC ¶ 61,040 at P 26).
[3] Order No. 861, 168 FERC ¶ 61,040 at P 25 (“[U]nder the proposal that we adopt herein, a successful challenge to Seller’s market-based rate authority will involve two demonstrations: (1) that the Seller has market power and (2) that such market power is not addressed by existing Commission-approved RTO/ISO market monitoring and mitigation.”).
[4] Market Monitor Protest (citing Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Complaint, Docket No. EL19-47-000 (filed Feb. 21, 2019)).
[5] Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that “FERC’s authority generally rests on the public interest in constraining exercises of market power”).