Item C-3: Commissioner James Danly Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part Regarding Northern Natural Gas Company

Commissioner James Danly Statement
March 22, 2021
Docket No. CP20-487-000
Order: C-3

I concur in part because I agree that the Commission should grant the requested Natural Gas Act (NGA) sections 7(b) and 7(c) authorizations.  I dissent in part because the Commission violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by reversing its longstanding determination that it is unable to assess the significance of a project’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or those emissions’ contribution to climate change without sufficient reasoning.  The Commission decides here that we will compare raw project emissions numbers to the national total and determine significance on that basis alone.  In so doing, we disregard a pending Notice of Inquiry (NOI) (that sought directly relevant additional comments) and announce our own fragmentary standard that provides no clarity because it fails to establish either a replacement framework or a threshold for when emissions will be deemed “significant.” 

This order represents regulatory malfeasance at its most arbitrary and capricious.  We leave the public and the regulated community—including investors upon whom we rely to provide billions of dollars for critical infrastructure—with no discernible principles by which the Commission intends to consider proposed projects.  We announce this dramatic change of direction without notice, in an obscure docket that is likely not to be appealed.  And it marks the second such surprise issuance in as many months.[1]

The majority, in reversing course, fails to engage in reasoned decision making and ignores the Commission’s obligations under the APA and the Commission’s role under the NGA.  The order is legally infirm.

I. Background and the New “Standard”

The Commission has repeatedly found that it is unable to assess the significance of a project’s GHG emissions or those emissions’ contribution to climate change.[2]  This finding is based on an acknowledgement that there exists no accepted methodology by which to make such assessments.  “Without an accepted methodology, the Commission cannot make a finding whether a particular quantity of greenhouse gas emissions poses a significant impact on the environment, whether directly or cumulatively with other sources, and how that impact would contribute to climate change.”[3] 

In part to address this precise issue, the Commission has a pending NOI in Docket No. PL18-1-000 concerning whether the Commission should revise its Certificate Policy Statement.[4]  Just last month, the Commission issued a unanimous order to add questions to this NOI,[5] including, “[i]n conducting an analysis of the impact of a project’s GHG emissions, how could the Commission determine the significance of these emissions’ contribution to climate change?”[6] 

Rather than wait for answers and compile record evidence in response to the questions we put forth last month, the Commission now answers the question itself.[7]  In today’s order, the majority explains that in making its significance determination “for different environmental impacts, the Commission necessarily considers different types of evidence, giving that evidence such weight as it deems appropriate using its experience, judgment, and expertise.”[8]  The majority then concludes that “there is nothing about GHG emissions or their resulting contribution to climate change that prevents us from making that same type of significance determination”[9] and that “NEPA does not require that the studies, metrics, and models . . . on which an agency relies be universally accepted or otherwise uncontested.”[10]  The majority thus compares the proposed project’s total GHG emissions from construction and operation of the project to the total GHG emissions of the United States through a bare recitation of the respective numbers.  No further analysis is offered.  The majority simply asserts that comparison enables the Commission to assess the project’s contribution to GHG emissions at the national level and to assess the significance of the project’s GHG emissions and their potential impact on climate change. 

Not only does the majority decline to institute an analytical framework, it does not even establish a threshold above which it will consider emissions to be “significant” under the standard it adopts.  It is no standard at all, merely a black box comparison of numbers the Commission can apparently apply however it sees fit on a case-by-case basis.  In this case, Northern Natural Gas Company (Northern Natural) luckily passes.  Other applicants, including in numerous cases currently pending before the Commission, must now guess whether their own significant investments in critical infrastructure will also pass the Commission’s ad hoc review.

II. The Commission’s Action is Unlawful

The Commission’s order today fails every applicable legal standard: it is arbitrary and capricious, fails reasoned decision making, and is not based on substantial evidence.  It also exceeds our authority under the NGA. 

To briefly recap these standards,

an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.[11] 

While the Commission “need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate[,] [s]ometimes it must—when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy . . . .  It would be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters.”[12] 

In order not to be arbitrary and capricious, the Commission’s decisions must be based on reasoned decision making.  The Commission “must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”[13]  The Commission must also base its decisions on substantial evidence in the record.  Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” that is, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”[14]  Finally, the Commission “is a ‘creature of statute,’ having ‘no constitutional or common law existence or authority, but only those authorities conferred upon it by Congress.’”[15]  The applicable statute is the NGA, and, as I discuss below, the NGA does not grant the Commission the authority to be an environmental regulator. 

With that reminder of the Commission’s obligations, let us briefly examine the infirmities of the order.

A. The Commission Fails to Explain its Departure from Precedent

The first problem with the Commission’s order is that it departs from current precedent without explanation.  The Commission has long acknowledged that there is no accepted methodology by which to determine the significance of GHG emissions.  The majority, however, “find[s] that the project’s contribution to climate change would not be significant.”[16]  There remains no accepted “significance” methodology, but now the Commission announces that it can “[i]n future proceedings . . . consider all appropriate evidence regarding the significance of a project’s . . . contribution to climate change.”[17]  The majority further announces that no matter how “the Commission’s approach to the significance analysis evolves,” and presumably it must “evolve” since as of today no “approach” can be said to exist, Northern Natural’s emissions “would not be considered significant.”[18]

The majority fails to offer any reason as to why it has changed its position and further fails to supply any explanation for how it arrives at its new conclusion.[19]  The section covering this sweeping reversal of policy covers paragraphs 29 to 36.[20]  That is eight paragraphs of citations to case law, descriptions of NEPA obligations and recitations of facts which were themselves recited (also sans analysis) in the Environmental Assessment.  The order makes no attempt whatsoever to explain what is and what is not significant, why the metrics it applies are legitimate, and how the facts in this case should be considered within that rubric.  It merely states the numbers,[21] offers what it calls “context,”[22] and then concludes that “[b]ased on this record, we find that the project’s contribution to climate change would not be significant.”[23] 

This is textbook arbitrary and capricious agency action.  The Commission cannot reverse its own precedent, purport to create a new methodology, fail to articulate that methodology, and then decree that the project in question has emissions so low that its new methodology, whatever it is, does not matter.  Such outcome-oriented decision making—to achieve a particular end without a means—is manifestly arbitrary and capricious and falls far short of satisfying the Commission’s obligations under the APA.[24]

B. The Commission Creates a Test with No Standards

Aside from being assured that it will “evolve,” the regulated community learns nothing from the majority’s “significance analysis” regarding what standards the Commission will apply when determining significance.  The Commission merely states that it may continue to offer bare comparisons of a project’s emissions to the national total, or it may not, and then it will consider whether the project’s emissions are significant.  That is it.

That is insufficient.  The Commission establishes no threshold.  It also offers no guidance as to how it will interpret the evidence before it.  The majority’s action is like posting a speed limit sign with a question mark instead of a number, leaving it to the police officer to decide arbitrarily whether you were speeding.  Although the Commission is authorized to make a “‘rational legislative-type judgment,’” the Commission may not “pluck a number out of thin air when it promulgates rules.”[25]  Rather, the Commission’s decision must “reflect[] its informed discretion, and is neither patently unreasonable nor ‘a dictate of unbridled whim,’” in order for the decision to constitute reasoned decision making.[26]

C. The Commission Has a Directly Applicable Pending Notice of Inquiry to Seek Evidence on the Issues It Purports to Resolve in this Order; to Ignore it is to Fail to Engage in Reasoned Decision Making

The Commission recognized just last month that it needed more information in order to decide whether to change its position regarding the feasibility of assessing significance and yet, my colleagues plow ahead with their policy change, uninterested in the fact that the questions presented in the NOI remain unanswered.[27]  This surely cannot be reasoned decision making. 

Given that the NOI’s comment period is still open and that it raises questions concerning whether a change in policy is feasible and whether the Commission even has the authority to establish its own methodology, the Commission should have waited at least until the remaining thirty-nine days of the comment period elapsed and until the record was developed and reviewed to determine whether a policy change such as that made here is appropriate or feasible.  Chairman Glick stated at last month’s Commission meeting that “[a]fter we have received the comments and have had an opportunity to review them, I hope to work with my colleagues to develop an approach to improve our certificate decision making process.”[28]  That approach would have allowed the Commission to have a developed record to inform its decision instead of the unsupported—and unexplained—policy we have instituted today.

D. The Commission Still Is Not an Environmental Regulator

There is no question that it is within the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) purview—not the Commission’s—to determine whether emissions will have a significant effect on the environment.[29]  In fact, the Clean Air Act provides just that.  Specifically, that statute states that the Administrator of the EPA shall identify stationary sources that “in his judgment . . . cause[], or contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” and establish standards of performance.[30]  Surely Congress did not intend for the Commission—an agency not charged with administering the Clean Air Act and lacking the expertise to develop a methodology to evaluate the significance of GHG emissions—to take such action.  Rather, the Commission’s role in administering the NGA is to “encourage the orderly development of plentiful supplies of . . . natural gas at reasonable prices.”[31] 

While adopting the role of environmental regulator may appeal to my colleagues, I would not act beyond the remit given to us by Congress.  I agreed with then-Chairman Chatterjee when he said:  “FERC is not an environmental regulator.  We have neither the expertise nor the authority to weigh in on how to best curb emissions.”[32]  Today’s order suggests otherwise. 

The Commission, as a mere “creature of statute,” can only act pursuant to law by which Congress has delegated its authority.[33]  Whether project emissions will have a significant effect on climate change is not within our expertise.  The regulation of air emissions, including GHG emissions, is assigned by the Clean Air Act, not the NGA, and that authority is delegated to the EPA, not the Commission.  The Commission must comply with NEPA, but that does not mean the Commission can or is equipped to come up with its own framework for determining significance of project emissions on climate change.  Because this is outside our expertise and we claim in this order to rely upon neither expert agency frameworks nor our own experience and expertise, we are effectively wetting a finger and putting it in the air.  This determination is not even entitled to Skidmore deference and may in fact be outside the scope of our statutory authorization.[34] 

III. The Commission’s Action Is Bad Governance

I would be hard pressed to imagine an issuance that would be less conducive to the deliberate and efficient development of natural gas infrastructure than this order.[35]  It drastically departs from our long-standing policies and in doing so offers nothing that would provide the certainty that the financial markets require to rationally deploy capital.  It leaves pipeline companies and those who depend on their services guessing what kind of project will pass muster, not just now, but in the future as the Commission’s analysis “evolves.”  Thus we are asking pipeline companies and their customers to chase a hazy, indistinct—and moving—target.  It would have been better for pipeline companies (though, admittedly, not for consumers) had we simply issued an order declaring that, until further notice, no section 7 certificates shall issue.  That, at least, would offer clarity and allow the pipelines to divert their capital for the time being to Treasury notes.

The issuance of today’s order is also unfair.  It marks a drastic departure from established Commission precedent and does so without warning.  Under the APA, it is of course the Commission’s privilege to decide whether to pursue its objectives by rulemaking or by adjudication.  But this change, I would argue, is more amenable to a generic proceeding.  The Commission appeared to agree with me when issuing our NOI.[36]

But the problem with issuing this decision during the pendency of the NOI is much greater than the seeming inconsistency.  One of the basic requirements of fairness is providing notice.  The Commission has done the opposite.  In fact, it has lulled people into believing that the answers to the questions appearing in the NOI had yet to be resolved.  Right now, parties are drafting their comments.  Imagine their surprise when they see today’s order.  Government should not conduct its business this way.

IV. The Commission’s Action is Improvidently Advanced

I do hope that the advancement of today’s order to this month’s agenda is not the cynical exercise it might appear to be.  A quick review of why this is a particularly inapt vehicle for sweeping policy changes will convince anyone that it was at best unwise to schedule it for a vote today because no one is likely in a position to challenge it, despite its dramatic reversal of policy and probable widespread effect.

First, no third party to the proceeding is likely in a position to seek rehearing.  This is for several reasons.  This is a small and obscure docket dealing with a relatively inconsequential section 7 certificate.  Accordingly, few parties sought to intervene.  Why would they?  How could this proceeding affect their interests?  Many parties who might otherwise have sought to participate had they known how important this case was going to be have not done so and are thereby deprived of a vehicle by which to challenge the Commission’s decision.

Second, the proponent is unlikely to seek rehearing.  Not only is Northern Natural unlikely to feel that it is aggrieved by an order that, whatever its reasoning, ultimately grants its requested authorizations, it is also in a Catch-22.  As much as Northern Natural may want to challenge the Commission’s reasoning because this order could very well pose challenges to other NGA section 7 applications it may pursue, it might decline to do so because, under the Commission’s current regulations, it would then have to wait until the Commission acts on its rehearing request in order to receive its notice to proceed with construction.[37]  Nonetheless, I would suggest that rehearing is in order to cabin the effect of this issuance and ensure that its consequences do not metastasize throughout the industry and obstruct every other pending project including those proposed by Northern Natural itself.

V. A Warning

This order is likely to have profound consequences.  I reiterate the advice I have given to everyone who would listen since the Commission’s issuance in Algonquin[38] last month: every single natural gas pipeline company, LNG company, and shipper should intervene in every single certificate item.  Start now.  Most interventions are costless.  If the requested intervention is out of time, rely upon this case and Algonquin as justification for prophylactic intervention in order to demonstrate good cause.  A reference to the pendency of the NOI, if that played any part in the decision not to file a timely intervention, would also not be amiss.  I would hope that, given how consequential these orders have been, the Commission would show particular solicitude to parties doing no more than that which is necessary to ensure that their rehearing and appeal rights are not extinguished, especially when they have twice been surprised by policy changes with no notice and because the Commission has recently granted late intervention after the issuance of the order for which intervention was sought.[39]

There are, of course, numerous other pending certificate applications.[40]  While this order provides no concrete guidance, the “significance” of the emissions of those projects are hardly likely to be deemed as minor as they were in this case.  The full implications of the Commission’s decision may not be apparent at first glance—the new “policy” is, after all, “evolving.”  Nevertheless, especially when paired with the majority’s seeming willingness to reopen closed certificate proceedings to evaluate whether there are “mitigation measures the Commission should impose in response to air emissions” for projects currently in operation,[41] I fear that today’s order marks the beginning of a series of decisions that will have profound effects on the industry, its customers, and on NGA section 3 and section 7 approvals going forward.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

 

Appendix A

The following questions are relevant to the determination made in this proceeding and are currently under consideration in the NOI (Docket No. PL18-1-000): 

C2. Are there any environmental impacts that the Commission does not currently consider in its cumulative impact analysis that could be captured with a broader regional evaluation?  If so, how broadly should regions be defined (e.g., which states or geographic boundaries best define different regions), and which environmental resources considered in NEPA would be affected on a larger, regional scale?  Does the text of NGA section 7 permit the Commission to do this?  If this is contemplated by the NGA, would one applicant’s section 7 application prejudice another applicant’s section 7 application?

C3. In conducting an analysis of a project, how could the Commission consider upstream impacts (e.g., from the drilling of natural gas wells) and downstream end-use impacts? Should applicants be required to provide information on the origin and end use of the gas?  How would the Commission determine end-use impacts if the gas is sent to a pooling point or a mid-stream shipper?  If the end use is electric generation or an LDC, how would the Commission determine the GHG emissions of existing and anticipated gas usage attributed to a project?  How would additional information related to upstream or downstream impacts of a proposed project inform the Commission’s decision on an application?  Should shippers who have subscribed capacity on a project (or potentially, the shippers’ customers) be encouraged to provide the type of information contemplated above?  If so, how might this be done?  How could such a policy be squared with CEQ’s final rule?

C4. In conducting an analysis of the impact of a project’s GHG emissions, how could the Commission determine the significance of these emissions’ contribution to climate change?  Should significance criteria be based on a specific fraction of existing carbon budgets in international agreements; state or regional targets; a specific fraction of natural carbon sinks; or other metrics?  If so, how and why would that basis be appropriate? Alternatively, should the Commission focus its analysis on GHG emission impacts on global climate metrics (e.g., CO2 levels, ocean acidification, sea level rise) or regional impacts (e.g., snowpack, storm events, local temperature changes)?  If so, how and why would that basis be appropriate?  What would be an appropriate GHG climate model for use on a project-level basis?  Is there any level of GHG emissions that would constitute a de minimis impact?  If so, how much and why would such number be appropriate?  How would such analysis meaningfully inform the Commission’s decision making?

C5. As part of the Commission’s public interest determination, how would the Commission weigh a proposed project’s adverse impacts against favorable impacts to determine whether the proposed project is required by the public convenience and necessity and still provide regulatory certainty to stakeholders?

C6. Does the NGA, NEPA, or other federal statute authorize or mandate the use of Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) analysis by the Commission in its consideration of certificate applications?  If so, how does the statute direct or authorize the Commission to use SCC? Does the statute set forth specific metrics or quantitative analyses that the Commission must or may use and/or specific findings of fact the Commission must or may make with regard to SCC analysis of a certificate application?  Does the statute set forth specific remedies the Commission must or may implement based on specific SCC findings of fact?

C7. If the Commission chooses to use the SCC tool, how could it be used to determine whether a proposed project is required by the public convenience and necessity?  How would the Commission determine the appropriate discount rate to use?  Should the Commission consider multiple discount rates or one discount rate?  Please provide support for each option.  How could the Commission use the SCC tool in the weighing of the costs versus benefits of a proposed project?  How could the Commission acquire complete information to appropriately quantify all of the monetized costs/negative impacts and monetized benefits of a proposed project?  Should the Commission use the tool to determine whether a project has significant effects on climate?  If so, how could the Commission connect the SCC estimate with the actual effects of the project?  What level of cost would be significant and why?

C8. Are there alternatives to the SCC tool that the Commission should consider using?  If so, how could the Commission use those tools?

C9. How could the Commission determine whether a proposed project’s GHG emissions are offset by reduced GHG emissions resulting from the project’s operations (e.g., displacing a more carbon-intensive fuel source such as coal or fuel oil)?

C10. How could the Commission impose GHG emission limits or mitigation to reduce the significance of impacts from a proposed project on climate change?  Can the Commission interpret its authority under NGA section 7(e) to permit it to mitigate GHG emissions?  If the Commission decides to impose GHG emission limits, how would the Commission determine what limit, if any, is appropriate?  Should GHG mitigation be considered only for direct project GHG emissions or should downstream end-use, or upstream emissions also be evaluated?  What are the options or methods applicants could propose to mitigate GHG emissions through offsets or other means?

 

Appendix B

The following list includes the Natural Gas Act section 7 and section 3 proceedings that are currently pending before the Commission.  I offer this list as a convenience.  Parties contemplating intervention would be well-advised to confirm the information contained in this appendix by referring to the relevant docket.

Applicant	Docket Number(s)	Name of Pending Matter	Intervention Deadline
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC	CP15-17-005	Request for Rehearing of Authorization to Commence Service of Phase II Facilities	N/A
Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC	CP15-554-004, CP15-554-005, CP15-554-006, and CP15-554-007	Requests for Rehearing of Notices to Proceed	N/A
Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC and Eastern Gas Transmission and Storage, Inc.	CP15-554-009 and CP15-555-007	Atlantic Coast Project Disposition and Restoration Plan and Supply Header Project Restoration Plan	4/16/21
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC	CP16-10-008	Request for Rehearing of Order Partially Lifting Stop Work Orders and Allowing Certain Construction to Resume	N/A
Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC and Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC	CP16-9-012	February 18, 2021 Order Establishing Briefing	4/5/21 deadline for initial briefs, 5/4/21 deadline for reply briefs
Spire STL Pipeline, LLC	CP17-40	March 18, 2021 Order on Environmental Compliance	N/A
Midship Pipeline Company, LLC	CP17-458 and CP19-17	March 18, 2021 Order on Environmental Compliance	N/A
Equitrans, L.P.	CP19-473	Tri-State Corridor Project	7/5/19
Commonwealth LNG, LLC	CP19-502	Commonwealth LNG Project	9/24/19
Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC	CP19-514	Liquefaction Project Amendment	10/31/19
Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC and Sabine Pass LNG, L.P.	CP19-515	Liquefaction Project Amendment	10/30/19
North Baja Pipeline, LLC	CP20-27	North Baja XPress Project	1/21/20
Equitrans, L.P.	CP20-312	Application for Abandonment of Gathering Facilities and Service	5/28/20
Freeport LNG Development, L.P.; FLNG Liquefaction, LLC; FLNG Liquefaction 2, LLC; and FLNG Liquefaction 3, LLC	CP20-455	Noble Gas Project	6/18/20
Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC	CP20-456	East Unionville Storage Field Certificate Amendment	6/17/20
PennEast Pipeline Company, LLC	CP20-47	2020 Amendment	3/4/20
Washington 10 Storage Corporation and South Romeo Gas Storage Company, L.L.C.	CP20-470	Washington 10 and South Romeo Storage Project	7/1/20
Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P.	CP20-48	Enhancement by Compression Project	3/4/20
Rio Bravo Pipeline Company, LLC	CP20-481	Rio Bravo Pipeline Project Amendment	7/16/20
ANR Pipeline Company and Great Lakes Gas Transmission Limited Partnership	CP20-484 and CP20-485	Alberta XPress Project	7/22/20
Tuscarora Gas Transmission Company	CP20-486	Tuscarora XPress Project	7/28/20
Northern Natural Gas Company	CP20-487	South Sioux City to Sioux Falls A-line Replacement Project	8/4/20
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C.	CP20-493	East 300 Upgrade Project	8/5/20
Andalusian Energy, LLC	CP20-496	Petition for Declaratory Order	8/20/20
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C. and Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C.	CP20-50 and CP20-51	Evangeline Pass Expansion Project and SNG Evangeline Pass Expansion Project	3/13/20
Northern Natural Gas Company	CP20-503	Northern Lights 2021 Expansion Project	9/2/20
WBI Energy Transmission, Inc.	CP20-52 and CP20-52-001	North Bakken Expansion Project	3/18/20
Delaware River Partners LLC and Bradford County Real Estate Partners LLC	CP20-522 and CP20-524	Petitions for Declaratory Order	10/15/20 and 10/23/20
Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC	CP20-527	East Lateral XPress Project	10/29/20
Stingray Pipeline Company, L.L.C.	CP20-528, CP20-528-001, and CP20-529	Application for Abandonment by Sale and Request for Jurisdictional Determination, Amendment, and Application for Abandonment by Sale	10/20/20 and 1/6/21
Port Arthur LNG Phase II, LLC and PALNG Common Facilities Company, LLC	CP20-55	Port Arthur LNG Expansion Project	3/25/20
Enable Gas Transmission, LLC and Enable Gulf Run Transmission, LLC	CP20-68 and CP20-70	Line CP Modifications/Gulf Run Pipeline	4/3/20
Golden Pass Pipeline LLC	CP21-1	Compression Relocation and Modification Project	11/9/20
Spire Storage West LLC	CP21-6	Clear Creek Expansion Project	11/12/20
Adelphia Gateway, LLC	CP21-14	Marcus Hook Electric Compression Project	2/16/21
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC	CP21-17	2021 Wellington Well Abandonments Project	2/16/21
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC	CP21-23	2021 Coco B and Coco C Wells Abandonment Project	3/15/21
Northern Natural Gas Company	CP21-28	Redfield Underground Storage Facility Buffer Zone Project	2/16/21
Texas Eastern Transmission, LP	CP21-31	Perulack Compressor Units Replacement Project	2/23/21
LA Storage, LLC	CP21-44	Hackberry Storage Project	3/3/21
Florida Gas Transmission Company, LLC	CP21-45	Big Bend Project	3/5/21
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC	CP21-57	Mountain Valley Pipeline Project Amendment	3/22/21
ANR Pipeline Company	CP21-78	Wisconsin Access Project	Awaiting notice