Docket No. RM22-14-000
Today’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) includes a number of significant revisions to the Commission’s pro forma interconnection queue requirements that appear to be based on robust evidence and to address real problems ailing the interconnection queues. I have long favored many of these proposals, which have been discussed in various technical conferences and in the Joint NARUC-FERC Task Force. These include (to name a few): (i) requiring transmission providers to adopt generally a “first-ready, first served” process for managing their interconnection queues;[1] (ii) requiring transmission providers to provide more information to potential interconnecting generators earlier in the process to facilitate greater cost certainty;[2] (iii) requiring generators in a later cluster to share the costs of previously identified network upgrades to the extent they directly benefit from them;[3] (iv) requiring stricter showings of readiness to enter into and stay in the queue;[4] (v) requiring an affected system study process and related pro forma study and construction agreements;[5] and (vi) requiring greater flexibility for co-located resources and for the use of surplus interconnection service.[6]
While I concur in issuing this NOPR and I support the queue reform provisions noted above, I also have to note that there are a few additional proposals in this NOPR that are not yet ready for prime time, either because they are potentially good ideas that have simply not been fully developed, or may not be a good ideas at all. I am willing, however, to put this NOPR out for comment on them. I thus encourage all interested parties to use the comment period to identify areas in which these proposals either need additional detail or may simply not be well-conceived, particularly those that may raise reliability concerns or engage in unhelpful or unnecessary micromanagement.
For example, I am wary of any Commission requirement that would replace the operating assumptions developed and used by transmission providers, whose primary job it is to ensure system reliability, with those requested by self-interested generators or resources seeking to interconnect to the grid.[7] So, to the extent allowing storage (or hybrid) resources to elect whether to be studied as charging at peak load (and/or extending greater flexibility to the operating assumptions used to other variable resources) would come at the risk of system reliability,[8] I want to hear those concerns. There are also a number of unanswered questions regarding the NOPR’s monetary penalty proposal, such as how it will work (or not work) in RTO/ISO regions, and whether or not it will actually incentivize timelier completion of interconnection studies.[9] I am conceptually in favor of imposing guidelines for completion of studies, but the penalty provisions do not answer definitively the most important question of all: Who will pay these penalties in an RTO or ISO which has no stockholders? Consumers certainly should not pay, directly or indirectly. Also, while I am in favor of requiring transmission providers to consider seriously alternative solutions to new transmission build that could be less costly, I could have supported a simple requirement to do so without proposing a mandatory list of specific technologies or commercial products and, in doing so, replacing the judgment and expertise of grid experts with our own.[10]
Finally, with regard to the queue reforms described in P 1 above, while I support them, I also caution strongly that we should avoid undermining through this NOPR what the RTOs/ISOs, working through their stakeholder processes, are already doing to fix their own queue problems. We should recognize that each RTO/ISO is different and faces unique local challenges and needs. The queue reforms proposed in today’s NOPR should be seen more as guideposts or general standards rather than unyielding mandates that refuse to take local solutions into consideration. I would allow RTOs/ISOs the opportunity to demonstrate that if their own efforts to enact queue reforms achieve the same goals in a different, but equally effective manner, their individual reform may be acceptable in complying with any final rule. While this NOPR currently recognizes the potential for regional flexibility,[11] I hope the need for such flexibility is explicitly memorialized in any final rule.
I look forward to reading the comments submitted in this proceeding and greatly appreciate the time and effort taken by all to provide the Commission with this important feedback.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
[1] NOPR at PP 64-79.
[2] Id. PP 42-52.
[3] Id. PP 98-101.
[4] Id. PP 115-123, 128-137, and 140-148.
[5] Id. PP 183-193 and 197-204.
[6] Id. PP 242-245 and 264.
[7] Id. PP 280-288.
[8] Id. P 286 (seeking comment “on whether the Commission should expand this reform to address operating assumptions for additional generating facility technologies that may currently be inaccurately modeled, such as variable energy resources”).
[9] Id. P 172 (seeking comment on “whether there is a more appropriate method for assigning [] penalties in RTOs/ISOs” and “whether monetary penalties may have adverse consequences [such as] incenting timeliness over accuracy”).
[10] Id. PP 298-301. Much of this NOPR’s long descriptions of the various specific proposed mandatory alternative technologies read more like a college seminar term paper than a serious exercise of this Commission’s legal authority. See, e.g., id. P 298. Engineers and planners who work in the field every day know well what these technologies are and which ones may be feasible or not.
[11] Id. P 6.