Commissioner Richard Glick Statement
May 12, 2020
Docket No. EL16-92-002, ER17-996-001

I concur in today’s order because it correctly states what should be the governing tariff language as a result of the Commission’s various orders in these proceedings.  That does not, however, mean that I agree with those orders.  As I have previously explained, “[b]uyer-side market power mitigation should be all about and only about mitigating buyer-side market power. To the extent that buyer-side market power mitigation rules apply to buyers without market power, they are per se unjust and unreasonable.”[1]  That means that the Commission should be imposing buyer-side market power measures on Special Case Resources only to the extent that they are buyers with market power.[2]  The Commission’s orders in this proceeding have failed to ensure that NYISO’s mitigation regime is tailored to that specific issue.  Accordingly, I continue to believe that NYISO’s mitigation regime is unjust and unreasonable and will impose arbitrarily high offer floors that will raise prices and make it more difficult for Special Case Resources to participate in NYISO’s capacity market. 

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

 

[1] N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, 170 FERC ¶ 61,120 (2020) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting at P 1).

[2] Id. P 19. 

 

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